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ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: CREDIT RATIONING
AND EXCESS LIQUIDITY
Hye-jin CHO
University of Paris1 - Panthéon Sorbonne
Hyejin.Cho@malix.univ-paris1.fr
Abstract: In examining the global imbalance by the excess liquidity level, the
argument is whether commercial banks want to hold excess reserves for the
precautionary aim or expect to get better return through risky decision. By
pictorial representations, risk preference in the Machina’s triangle (1982, 1987)
encapsulates motivation to hold excess liquidity. This paper introduces an
endogenous liquidity model for the financial sector where the imbalance argument
comes from credit rationing extended from outside liquidity (Holmstrom and
Tirole, 2011). We also conduct a stylistic analysis of excess liquidity in Jordan
and Lebanon from 1993 to 2015. As such, the proposed model exemplifies the
combination of credit, liquidity and regulation.
Keywords: credit rationing, excess liquidity, inside liquidity, risk preference,
machina triangle
JEL: D81; E58; L51
1. Introduction:
The global imbalance 1 as cross-country differences in saving and investment
patterns is pervasive and thought provoking, giving good reasons to advocate re-
duction of imbalance. To be sure, there have been studies concerned specifically
with this problem, but the question has also been raised as to whether domestic and
international distortions can be a key cause of imbalance regardless of economic
development levels or financial externalities. It is diverse to say specific drivers to
position imbalance but liquidity reflecting credit of commercial banks in the eco-
nomic cycle can react to global imbalance with rational expectation.
1Blanchard’s account (2007)
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The attempt to explain global imbalance which is the macroeconomic broad ques-
tion on the notion of endogenous liquidity structuring the financial expectation
might be further brought into question like killing two birds with one stone. At the
outset, what I try to do in this paper is to offer plausible explanations as to why out-
side liquidity (excess liquidity) can cause inside liquidity 2(surplus liquidity) which
is intimately linked with credit rationing 3. Commercial banks should decide the
composition of liquid assets with outside liquidity-currency, reserves, money base.
The decision of liquidity might be on whether assets can be melted to make more
liquidity in the risky situation or liquid assets as liability is excessively equipped.
The concept of excess holds particularly true for reflecting rational expectation in
liquidity. Otherwise, excess liquidity without rational expectation should be re-
duced. Hence, credit rationing to recognize the inside liquidity in open market op-
erations makes reasonable to measure the appropriate outside liquidity to be hold.
Specifically, this study establishes the contour of arguments about financial institu-
tional reasons (appropriate level of holding liquidity) and incentive considerations
(outcome uncertainty is endogenous). The meaning of required reserves and net
lending in this paper closely parallels the notion of inside liquidity and outside liq-
uidity4 introduced by Holmstrom and Tirole (2013).
From outside liquidity to inside liquidity, within this context, the classification
(Brunnermeier-Pedersen, 2008) of an asset’s market liquidity (i.e., the ease with
which is traded) and traders’ funding liquidity (i.e., the ease with which they can
obtain funding) is grounded in those certain rules drawing on financial regulation.
When it comes to the funding gap (Cressy, 2000), homogenous funding gap is
merely defined as expenditure caused by the gap between alleged debt and equity
2Ostensibly, there are three sources of outside liquidity defined by Holmstrom and Tirole (2013):
(1) consumers, who can securitize their assets, notably the houses they own; (2) the government,
which can issue claims backed by its exclusive right to tax consumers and producers; and (3) inter-
national financial markets, which can offer liquidity in the form of claims on international goods and
services.
3Holmstrom and Tirole, 2013
4The explanatory power of the model by Holmstrom and Tirole (2013) has been convincingly
structured from the notion of inside and outside money introduced by Gurley and Shaw (1960). For
example, Blanchard and Fischer (1989: ch.4) state:
Any money that is on net an asset of the private economy is outside money. Under the gold standard,
gold coins were outside money; in modern fiat money systems currency and bank reserves, high-
powered money, and the money base constitute outside money. However, most money in modern
economics is inside money, which are simultaneously an asset and a liability of the private sector.
Namely, Holmstrom and Tirole (2013) define inside and outside liquidity depending on the source
of the pledgeable income. When the pledgeable income is generated by the corporate sector, the
claims on it constitute inside liquidity. All claims on goods and services outside the corporate sector
constitute outside liquidity.
2
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gaps in national economies within a framework of a balance sheet. Beyond the
scale of a balance sheet, heterogeneous funding gap is defined by positive funding
gap at an equilibrium, that is, the volume of lending is below the criteria of a com-
petitive capital market perfectly operated by costless and complete contracts and
no private information and rational expectations is following. Otherwise, norma-
tive funding gap can be from a market failure so the policy responds to which is an
increase in the volume of lending.
The normative funding gap might throw light on new intuition escaped from double-
booking which should be always balanced in banks’ on-balancesheet in imbalance
modeling. If a market fails to balance, evidently, rational decision makers try to
search for the maximized solution to increase possibility of potential outcome for
the future. Much of the decision framework upon the rational expectation is be-
yond the arrangement of outcomes expected from initial state. To say the least, the
aim of this study about excess liquidity is to provide an overview of the financial
regulation with rational expectation in economic imbalanced situation.
The financial regulator observes risky outcomes of different choices decided by
expectation of a rational decision maker. Potential outcomes in the future can
be defined by the expected value of functions. The existence of cardinal utility
function related to preferences on random outcomes is proved by Von Neumann-
Morgenstern (1947). Due to the interval scale of this measurement, in fact the reg-
ulator is not certain until the future outcome is revealed. Hence, the limit between
hard regulation and soft regulation are presented in sharp detail as the interval scale
of index comes up in the model.
The consequences of rational expectation requirement are quite complex. Even if
we limit our analysis to the financial regulation in excess liquidity, it would have
at least three important effects that should be taken into account:
1. The effect on credit rationing within fixed reserve scale,
2. The effect on excess liquidity in the liquidity composition,
3. The effect on inside liquidity in Machina Triangle by uncertain outcome.
The present paper focuses on the financial sector constructing the imbalance
argument. As such, it exemplifies the combination of credit rationing, excess liq-
uidity and regulation.
2. A Model of Credit Rationing applied from (Holmstrom-Tirole, 2013) with
Fixed Reserve Scale in the Banking Sector
The premise which underpins a good deal of my subsequent argument is the
investment in comparative statics as analogous to required reserves within fixed
investment scale. Both motivations of investment and required reserves bear a
3
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striking resemblance to dynamics of comparative statics. Research on investment
in comparative statics is still in its early stage, as the brevity of the bibliography
attests. It may heighten by filling with two aspects: (1) insured amount and (2)
parameterization.
Disputably, the investment is not prominent in satisfaction. As is well known, it
is assumed that more consumption is always better for the consumer in the sense
of increasing his or her utility. However, it is not a same token for investment.
Investors demand high-yielding investments to increase utility. The point is that
regulator cannot go to some lengths to establish the utility of investment before re-
vealing the profit. Taking up this issue, insured investment amount can partake of
investment in comparative statics. In applying insured investment to move toward
the statics, nonpledgeability is closly fetched for being moved of insured invest-
ment.
Figure 1. Pledgeable Demand Deposit (DD) and a Positive Wedge Z1 − Z0 (rent).
0 DD
Z0
RR
I
pledgeable
R
Z1
identification symbols: DD (Demand Deposit), RR (Required Reserves), R
(Reserve), Z0 (opportunity value in positive wedge Z1 − Z0), Z1 (positive net present value in positive wedge Z1 − Z0).
Supposedly, parameterization in comparative statics might be put involved parts.
It bases categories on the juxtaposition of a series of contrasts of exogenous con-
straints on payouts and another based on endogenous constraints. Here, for exam-
ple, exogenous liquidity backs up the amount relevant to a precautionary aim as a
maximized whole that only the central bank can enjoy, such as the potentiality of
lending on a future loan project or increased loan position status. In the second
category, the endogenous of excess should be feasible to pay out to projects hav-
ing profitability. It reduces the excess of central banks and the reduced portion is
distributed to consumers and producers by commercial banks.
Seen from this point of view, required reserves are tantamount to insured invest-
ment as being fixed but also casting itself in the role of nonpledgeability in case
of bankruptcy. Consider a commercial bank with a precautionary reserve which
is bigger than demand deposit can be claimed by depositors in commercial banks.
Here by, the required reserve has a positive precautionary value but it is not in-
dependent liquidity. Capital adequacy can require illiquidity more than demand
deposit. The shortfall, difference between demand deposit and required reserves,
must be secured by deposit insurance to prevent the bank run (or covered by claims
4
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on the market value of domestic assets in commercial banks).
There are various reasons why commercial banks cannot have larger demand de-
posits than reserves, that is, why there is a positive wedge (commercial banks’
precautionary reserves) R − DD > 0. By borrowing the concept of optimal rent,
Z1 − Z0 > 0 which can be interval to sustain the trajectory of investment, we can
put explanation into two general categories: one based on exogenous constraints
on required reserves and another based on endogenous constraints. The prime ex-
ample of exogenous constraints is an insurance cost on deposits that commercial
banks should pay, such as certain amount of demand deposits per household should
be secured by insurance. Likewise, accumulation of reserves is potential benefits
to deviate from solvency risk by showing the high level of solvency. A related in-
tangible benefit is derived from risk aversion when it comes to continue on-going
banking business.
However, depositors do not value the precautionary reserve. It might be in a sense
of financial regulation. There is possibility that banks drive business fully tak-
ing the risky situation, such as asset-liability mismatch that a bank might borrow
money by issuing floating interest rate bonds, but lend money with fixed-rate mort-
gages. If interest rates rise, the bank must increase the interest it pays to its bond-
holders, even though the interest it earns on its mortgages has not increased. If
source of liquidity in liabilities is riskier than one in assets, evidently, demand de-
posit is excessive than reserve.
2.1. Excess Liquidity
In what follows, the question about meaning of excess amount reserves ul-
timately hinges on the shift from the risk aversion by certain outcome (required
reserve) to the risk taking by uncertain outcome (excess liquidity). By applying
this challenging conceptual approach to the subject, Saxegaard (2016) illustrates
about holdings of precautionary reserves in the country having a contraction in the
supply of credit by banks because of poorly developed interbank market.
More to the immediate point, excess liquidity (Saxegaard, 2016) is equated
to the quantity of reserves deposited with the central bank by commercial banks
plus cash in vaults in excess of the required statutory level. Hence, an increase
of deposits in the private sector increases commercial banks’ holdings of excess
liquidity as banks act to insure themselves against shortfalls in liquidity in the case
of Sub-Saharan Africa on a quarterly basis of IMF data from 1990:Q1 to 2004:Q4.
Excess Liquidity (EL)= Excess Cash + Excess Reserves (ER)
Table 1. Excess Liquidity (EL) and Excess Reserve (ER)
5
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In the light of above equations, the excess liquidity (EL) is the holding loss
which should be liquid to maximize satisfactions of consumers and profits of pro-
ducers. Moreover, we can assume the monetary status of consolidated commercial
banks (except for the central bank) in three assumptions. Firstly, consolidated com-
mercial banks hold excess reserves which are not inserted into the required reserve.
Secondly, the reserve requirement can be between 1% and 10%. Thirdly, the bor-
rowed money is deposited into a checking account at another bank that is not any of
the previous banks. Within precautionary reserves such as Reserves (R) >Demand
Deposit (DD), following equations sum up those three assumptions.
• Reserves (R) = Excess Reserves (ER) + Required Reserves (RR),
• Required Reserves (RR) = m × Demand Deposit (DD), m = [1%, 10%],
• 4 in money supply = 1
m
× Excess Reserves (ER), where m is a ratio related
to change (4).
In defining excess reserve, attention to the categorization by the 11th level of
demand deposit to reserves reveals an index of required reserves from 1 (smallest)
to 11 (Largest) as below:
Reserves (R) < Demand Deposit (DD),
• Demand Deposits (DD) - Reserves (R),
• Excess Reserves (ER) =
(DemandDeposits(DD) − Reserves(R)︸                                              ︷︷                                              ︸
Level11th
+ (Reserves(R) − RequiredReserves(RR)︸                                              ︷︷                                              ︸
Level1stto10th
,
Conversely, Reserves (R) > Demand Deposit (DD) (precautionary reserves),
• Excess Reserves (ER) = Reserves (R) - Required Reserves (RR),
• Required Reserves (RR) ÷ Demand Deposits (DD) (Level 1st to 10th,
according to Required Reserves (RR) ÷ Demand Deposits (DD) ÷ 10),
• Reserves (R) > Demand Deposit (DD), RR/DD > 1 (excess liquidity).
This framework using reserves (R) and demand deposit (DD) is consistently
linked to liquidity analyses of (Patinkin 1965 chap.5; Tobin 1965; Niehans 1978;
Diamond and Dybvig 1983). Especially interesting from their points of demand
deposit in two regards, it can be "demand for liquidity" and "transformation" ser-
vice provided by commercial banks. The analysis of Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance
6
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and Liquidity (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) embodies uninsured demand deposit
contracts are able to provide liquidity but leave banks vulnerable to runs. Liquid-
ity is intimated linked with possibility of liquidity that the bank knows how many
withdrawals will occur in demand deposit when confidence is maintained.
The juxtaposition between excess reserve and demand deposit has strong asso-
ciation which underlines the connection between excess liquidity and uninsured
liquidity. The vulnerability of bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) occurs be-
cause there are multiple equilibria with differing levels of confidence.
Liquidity role stands to reason that is differ from the Diamond and Dybvig model
(1983). Apparently, for investors, asset liquidity is linked to the market operation
(Jacklin, 1987; Haubrich and King, 1990; von Thadden, 1997; Hellwig, 1994).
On the other hand, it should be added by transaciton between banks and markets.
Uncertainty about amount of liquidity (Diamond, 1997) is useful concept that the
liquid probability of cardinal utility(Diamond, 1997) of consumptions of firms is
started to be argued. However, banks are merely objects having assets should be
melted to be liquid because banks want to be inserted in the market operations.
Nature of the banking industries exists in two sides of assets and liabilities, fur-
thermore, in on balancesheet factors and off balancesheet factors in open market
operations.
Liquidity creation is in two sides of a coin about riskinesses. It can be argued for
liquidity creating riskless and causing the problem in risky asset markets (Gorton
and Pennacchi, 1990). Otherwise, borrowing and lending are permitted but con-
strained (Kehoe and Levine, 2001).
certain outcome uncertain outcome
DD index
DD − R
R
DD − R
DD
DD (Demand Deposit) R (Reserves)
RR index
R − RR
RR
R − RR
R
RR (Required Reserve)
Table 2. DD Index and RR Index in uncertainty
As above, using two different indexes stands to reason that for certain outcome
in demand deposit (DD) index, how far demand deposit is bigger than reserves, for
uncertain outcome, within the scale of demand deposit, where reserves are located.
Otherwise, for certain outcome in required reserve (RR) index, how far reserves are
bigger than required reserves, for uncertain outcome, within the scale of reserves,
where required reserves are located.
7
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2.2. Credit Rationing
Because of non pledgeability of required reserves (RR) in case of bankruptcy,
pledgeable demand deposit (DD) can be marked by RR−DD > 0, required reserves
(RR) will be required for strict positive net present value in banks. Let A be the
excess liquidity of capital at the vortex of precautionary aim.
A ≥ A¯ ≡ RR − DD > 0. (1)
A lower bound A¯ on liabilities and equities of banks invites a reading on sev-
eral levels of understanding. The negative effect of a lower bound A¯ is achieved
through increasing of demand deposit (DD) comparably than required reserves
(RR), DD > RR. Commercial banks need to extend their deposit level paralleled
to demand deposit (DD). On the other hand, central banks require the reserve level
to commercial banks. Admittedly, A lower bound A¯ is credit-rationed.
Figure 2. Positive Credit Rationing (left) and Negative Credit Rationing (right)
For example, demand deposits of commercial banks contain loans, excess re-
serves and required reserves. excess reserves can pay demand deposits incurred by
loans. The composition between excess reserves and loans can be arranged. All
in all, central banks have commercial bank reserves as liabilities. In some specific
cases, required reserve rate is the percentage of deposit in demand deposit. At all
events, reserve amount should cover the demand deposit for credit rationing. A
commercial bank is overnight interbank interest player in a case of
A < R − DD. (2)
Why would a commercial bank hold excess reserves at the central bank? The
motivation to hold excess reserves has relevance to make more networks between
small banks and a big bank. For example, a small bank Tiny has lent more money
than they intended so some of expected incoming funds did not arrive timely. A
8
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small bank Tiny faces the problematic situation of liquidity shortage to meet the
required reserve supposed to be sent to the central bank. On the other hand, a big
bank Too Big Too Fail has excess cash. A big bank Too Big Too Fail is supposed
to lend to a small bank Tiny. An announcement "I lend you" by a big bank Too
Big Too Fail executes an overnight wire so a small bank Tiny can meet the required
reserves at the end of day. Indeed, overnight wire isn’t a wire of cash between
banks. It is a wire of cash to reserves of a central bank paralleled to loans of a
small bank Tiny. Consequently, commercial banks’ excess reserves are involved
in reserves of central banks. Generally speaking, bank size is maintained. For an
excess reserved bank, a change of excess reserves in the composition of a balance
sheet is less risky when it is involved in reserves of central banks.
In spite of rearrangement at the balancesheet composition, excess liquidity has
positive value than low bound A¯ because excess liquidity contains cash vaults and
ATMs beyond excess reserves.
R − RR ≥ R − RR − A, (3)
In spite of easy deduction with excess liquidity A, being able to transfer cash
payoffs does not imply that utility is transferable: wealthy and poor players may
derive a different utility from the same amount of money. If capital is credit ra-
tioned at the low bound A¯, the utility payoff U of banks shows satisfaction about
funding value to hold excess liquidity A depending upon utility jumps at A = A¯.
U =
A + R − RR, if A ≥ A¯ ,A, if A < A¯ . (4)
To put it differently, the difference between excess liquidity A and low bound
A¯ implies tolerance level of excess cash. The candidate to achieve low bound A¯
(=RR−DD) can be proper amount of cash holdings. Because required reserves are
various, I am puzzle on the important scale between the precautionary reserve and
the decision to hold excess funds for hedging liquidity confronting risky situation
like wars and terrors which is different at each country. In case of only A left in the
payoff utility if A < A¯, that is DD − RR > 0, banks want to bet more on hazardous
liquidity A. Simultaneously, the risk-averse bank turns into the risk-taking invest-
ment plan.
The moral hazard problem occurs when the poor status of borrowing banks is neg-
liged by lending banks. Let A ≡ DD − RR > 0 be the scale of the hazardous
liquidity, let ρ0 be the total expected return of pledgeable DD−R, and ρ1 the return
of excess R − RR, both measured per unit invested.
9
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Figure 3. Excess Demand Deposit (DD) and a Negative Wedge Z1 − Z0 (rent)
0 RR R(Z1) DD(Z0)
ρ1 ρ0
identification symbols: RR (Required Reserves), R (Reserve), DD (Demand Deposit)
Thus, A results in a total payoff (ρ0 + ρ1) × A of which ρ0 can be pledged to
outside investors. The residual ρ0 × A is the minimum rent of overnight investment
plan to the bank.

ρ1 = pH × R,
ρ0 = pH × (R − B
ρ0
),
(5)
where pH is denoted as the probability of success, B as the return of a bad plan and
R as return.
The rational bank expects the return from overnight investment plan. Hence,
we get:
0 < ρ1 < 1 < ρ0. (6)
Consequently, the bank has the minimum illiquidity ratio:
1 − ρ1, (7)
Maximum betting level for excess liquidity investment plan is:
A ≡ DD − RR
1 − ρ1 . (8)
and gross payoff is:
Ug =
(ρ0 − ρ1) × A
1 − ρ1 = µA, (9)
where
µ ≡ ρ0 − ρ1
1 − ρ1 (10)
10
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2.3. Inside liquidity and Contingent Shocks
Consider a three-period economy, t = 0, 1, 2 with a single outside liquidity-
"gold." Banks are risk taking and value capital according to
k0 + k1 + k2.
Banks have large endowments of gold in each period but no way of storing gold
from one period to next. Equivalently, they have labor endowments that can be
used to produce gold that must be balanced in the period it is produced. There is
outside liquidity as a gold in the economy for now; all liquidity is embedded in the
returns of the financial sector. In particular, banks cannot promise to fund future
investments without backing up their promises with claims on pledgeable returns;
the banks’ future endowments are not pledgeable.
Assumed that required reserves are monotonically increasing. Merit discussion
focuses on similar monotonic increasing nonlinear line of endogeneous variables.
A further point needs to be made with fixed scaled shocks impacting on the trend
line of guided criteria. We shall check whether endoegenous variables are compa-
rably statics following the guided trendline with shocks or not.
The order-theoretic single crossing property of Milgrom and Shannon (1994)
in the theory of comparative statics is useful for verifying when the required level
in regulation is monotonically increasing. Hereby, endoegenous variable is demand
deposit and an exogeneous parameter is shock as below:
DEFINITION (single crossing property) Let endogeneous X (demand deposit)
and parameter T (shock) be partially ordered sets. A function f : X × T → R
is said to satisfy the single crossing property in (x; t) if for all x′ > x∗: whenever
f (x′, t∗) ≥ (>) f (x∗, t∗), then f (x′, t′) ≥ (>) f (x∗, t′) for all t′ > t∗.
Simply, the slope which has the flow and following the trendline of guided
amount is not moving upward entirely. The example in figure 4 derived from Edlin-
Shannon (1998) can be shown as below:
11
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Figure 4. Comparative statics in investment
Comparative statics in investment is the comparison of two different pledgeable
portpolios, before and after a change of an exogeneous shock within fixed scale by
credit rationing. Here by, credit rationing is specified in the gap between insured
amount and parameterized amount: pledgeable demand deposit and required re-
serves. The excess liquidity composed by excess reserves is a kind of a shock.
The exogeneous shock is measured by demand deposit index and required reserve
index obtained by credit rationing.
To reach a easier understanding of credit rationing, assume that required reserve
(RR) of a bank is monotonically increasing. Certainly, the aim of soft regulation
is to check comparatively statics to sufficiently follow the trend of guideline. not a
limitation of specific guideline about an amount.
Therefore, when we check the change when the slope is increasing, the change
before shock and one with shock increase. However, the change is not beyond
the required reserve line. Change is comparably statics but it shows increasing is
vigorously continous along monotonic increasing of criteria for regulation. There
remains a range of problems to be tackled because shocks in investment have com-
parativly statics so it can be nonlinear motions but the lending contract has the fixed
term which can be seen in the linear approximation.
2.4. Net lending: The case of certainty
At date 1, the liquidity shock ρ ≥ 0 takes place. Let i(ρ) ≤ RR denote the con-
tinuation scale and at least shock can cover the worst scenario, ρ0 < ρ. Remark that
ρ1 = pH × R,
ρ0 = pH × (R − B
ρ0
),
(11)
12
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where pH is denoted as the probability of success, B as the return of a bad plan, R
as return.
We assume the high liquidity shock is fL = 1 and ρH = ρ. Further, 1 + ρ < ρ1,
implying that the betting on overnight plan would always be worth undertaking
from a net present-value point of view. If there are no liquidity problems, a bank
with funds A ≡ DD − RR transfers certain amount to the central bank as follows at
date 0: He chooses RR as the initial scale of the project and invests (ρ−ρ1)×RR > 0
into a liquid asset or a credit line, where RR is set to exhaust the budget, (1 + ρ −
ρ0) × RR = A. With these initial investments the bank is able to cover exactly the
deterministic liquidity shock ρ at date 1. He can raise ρ1 × RR by making an angel
loan against his pledgeable date-2 deposits and add to it his portfolio in liquidity
(ρ − ρ1) × RR.
The plan presumes that there is a liquid assert, or a credit line backed by a liquid
asset, that allows the bank to save (ρ− ρ1)× RR from date 0 to date 1. However, in
the economy just described, the only available assets are claims on the continuation
value of banks looking to save. Suppose, hypothetically, that all banks are able to
meet the date-1 liquidity need ρ × RR and therefore to continue at full scale. Then
the date-1 continuation value of the financial sector is ρ1 × RR. But this is less
than the liquidity needed, ρ×RR. Since, the net continuation value of the financial
sector, (ρ1 − ρ) × RR, is negative, consequently the financial sector can neither act
as a store of value nor provide collateral for future funding by institution.
This is itself emblematic of certain inside liquidity. Lending can be tied to the
duration by fixed contract given five years or more. In detail, complete information
about returns of portfolio is revealed in the loan contract. By contrast, preference
of banks is incomplete information in comparative statics. Suffice it to say that this
requires uncertainty methodology which can be better in a pictorial way for easier
explanation.
2.5. Selected Liquid Characteristics of Village I and Village II
Having outlined the institutional context dealing with different countries, the
discussion now turns to the real economy. In order to provide a framework for
more detailed consideration of credit rationing, it will be helpful to compare two
villages. There is a marked contrast between a village I holding a small reserve
(reserve ratio 7%) and a village II holding an excess reserve (reserve ratio 30%).
To a great extent, within the outside liquidity system, both village I and village II
are conceived of excess liquidity (7867, 44800) : ≡ currency issued (5886, 400,
current USD, million) + excess reserve (1981, 44400, current USD, million).
13
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(Current USD, million) Village I Village II
Outside Liquidity in domestic currency, liabilities
currency issued 5,886 400
required reserve 2,053 19,200
excess reserve 1,981 44,400
reserve money 9,920 64,000
demand deposit, commercial banks 12,684 3,028
excess liquidity R < DD DD < R
Inside Liquidity
overnight deposit window rate 2.75 2.75
credit rationed A -10,631 60,972
domestic credit to private sector by banks to GDP (%) 70 99.2
net commercial bank lending and other private credits 250 -43
Table 3. Selected Liquid Characteristics in 2014 5
For one thing, excess reserve (64000) and reserve money (44400) in Village II
is higher than in Village I (9920, 1981). It can be puzzled how domestic credit to
private sector by banks to GDP in Village II (99.2) is higher than Village I (70). It
bears the imprint of importance to make an attention on two criteria to understand
excess liquidity: R < DD or DD < R. This may in part be due to pledgeability of
demand deposit, illiquidity of reserves and more liquidity of demand deposit are
emphasized by contrasting two different liquidities. The comparison is partially
developed in creditability judged by expectation of investors.
Insofar as credit rationing going to two different lengths is concerned: insured and
parametrized in the optimum, an endogenous liquidity model still calls attention to
the central problem as to satisfy the goal of investors by insured and parameterized
comparative statics of optimal investment values.
The question has been raised in comparative statics as to whether investors increase
5source: village I by data in Jordan by Central Bank of Jordan, village II by data in Lebanon by
Central Bank of Liban in 2014 and world bank data.
2. complementary economic information about village I and village II, reference: world bank data.
Village I Village II
Population (total) 7,416,083 5,612,096
GDP (millions, Current USD) 3,587 4,573
GDP per capita (Current USD) 4,830 8,148
commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults 19. 85 29.84
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 70 103
Bank nonperforming loans to gross loans (%) 5.6 4
Bank capital to asset (%) 12 8
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the amount of investment or not. Our concern is not with the increase of broad in-
vestment amount which can be credited but with insured and parametrized amount
getting to the optimal value.
A richer analysis of the interdependence between the excess liquidity and credit
rationing components in the spread between pledgeable and unpleageable amount
for different countries can be carried out by considering the government policy rule
changing the mix of assets held by the private sector through open market opera-
tions (Kiyotaki-Moore, 2008).
For example, a look at functioning of the economy by the central bank’s balance
sheet, Garreth (2015) argues on impact of central bank collateral choices in Bank
of England caused by the Asset Purchase Facility (APF) reaching 375 billion by
late 2012.
Additionally, a clue to changes of asset composition is provided by numerous styl-
ized facts about the asset purchases and the freshly created reserves in Hong Kong
(long-standing currency peg regime since 2005 by Hong Kong Monetary Author-
ity (HKMA) and Thailand (inflationary targeted (0.5-3.0%) operational strategy to
absorb excess liquidity by market.
There can be little doubt that offset in the same composition is always possible in
the changeable composition. The change of positioning in the same frame figura-
tive as the change of a composition carries articulation of flows. By the way, this
framework requires heavy emphasis on the proof that the value of investment has
single-valued because the value can be representable in the balance sheet. The puz-
zle on offset among different values obtained by credit rationing sets the tone for
investment having multi-dimensional valued regardless of on-balancesheet factors
and off-balancesheet factors.
2.6. Composition of Liquidity
At the heart of credit rationing lies the conception of the liquidity composition.
In relation to what I have previously said that Village I and Village II are having
excess liquidity as far as excess cash and excess reserves concerned. In detail, even
though the measurement of excess cash is not easy, Village I are having the excess
reserve than required reserves (3340 > 694). Likewise, Village II are having the
excess reserves than required reserves as well as Village I (44400 > 19200). By
the way, a closer look at the compositon with credit rationing, demand deposit -
required reserves (-1764 , 16172) gives a different answer.
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Village and Credit Rationing, Certainty, Precautionary Uncertainty,
Liquidity I : -(DD-R) excess liquidity Level Index inside liquidity
Composition II: RR-DD I: (R-RR) ÷ R (Lowest 1- I: (DD-R) ÷ DD
II: (R-RR) ÷ RR Highest 11) II: (DD-R) ÷ R
Village Village I, II Village I, II Village I, II Village I , II
currency issued 5886 , 400
required reserve 694 , 19200
reserve ratio 7% , 30%
excess reserve 3340, 44400
reserve money 9920, 64000
demand deposit 12684 , 3028
credit rationing -11990 , 16172
excess reserve 1981 (actu), 44400
(R-RR) ÷ RR 93 % , 233 %
Level Index level 11
(DD-R) ÷ R 22%, -0.0084 %
Table 4. Composition of Village Liquidity in 2014
identification symbols: DD (Demand Deposit), R (Reserve), RR (Required Reserves),
source: village I by data in Jordan by Central Bank of Jordan, village II by data in Lebanon by Central Bank of Liban in 2014 and world bank data.
Seen in the perspective of an asset-liability match, demand deposit exerted a
strong influence on reserves. It is not seem to rash to suggest required reserves as a
percentage of net demand deposits held in commercial banks by customer. Demand
deposit against reserves is total demand deposits less "due from" (Allen, 1956). No
single explanation can account for the single driver to describe the change of re-
serves with credit and demand deposit. However, Several assumptions are worth to
be mentioned for the sake of financial regulation.
It is not unreasonable to postulate that credit rationing is differently interpreted as a
transaction holding a liability (Henderson, 1960), reserve credit (Allen, 1956) and
a monetary instrument (Siegel, 1981). It can be a transaction (Henderson, 1960)
for a borrower occupied by the federal funds absorption ratio of a financial liabil-
ity defined as the amount of federal funds which directly and indirectly support a
one-dollar public holding of the liability. As a matter of the fact, a country bank
allows a reserve city bank with different reserve requirements by shifting interbank
deposits depending upon reserve credit (Allen, 1956) because the total reserve is
not changed and only distribution among banks by shifts in interbank balances.
Additionally, as a monetary instrument, optimal reserve requirement on demand
deposits (Siegel, 1981) controls the value of monetary aggregates.
As a closer look at the composition of Village Liquidity in 2014, credit rationing
of Village I (R < DD = 9920 < 12684) is negative and on the other hand, Village
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II (R > DD = 64000 > 3028) is positive. It indeed may be said with safety that
motivation to hold liabilities excessively is purely surplus reserves in 1930 with-
out any economic purpose caused by lack of good loan opportunities. After crisis
2007, good loan opportunities hinges on a series of remedies in a bad economic
situation up to one country and more.
Passively accumulated excess liquidity is not merely explained by the conservative
banking system. At the same time, as a meaning of proper loan commitment, it is
no less dubious to connect that the bank behavior in the uncertain situation should
be viewed with reservation. It is no wonder the motif to hold excess liquidity is
good reason to show credit facility to induce good loan opportunities and obtain
safer investment return by overnight interest. This motivation requires a quite log-
ical explanation with small sample of reserves in a vulnerable economy.
3. Inside Liquidity in a Machina’s Triangle
A further point needs to be made with regard to inside liquidity. This part will
be a step toward a richer and more inclusive understanding of the ease with which
investors can obtain funding. With problems to deal with potential outcomes re-
sulting from funding, expected value needs to be calculated with cardinal utility
function before revealed preference.
Measurement of cardinal utility function needs to look more closely at the interval
scale. Now for an example of three events which the event A and B are uncertain
to occur and C is certain to occur:
P(A or B and C) = P(A ∪C) + P(B ∪C)
In this discussion, when we say "A or B and C occur" we include three possi-
bilities:
1. A occurs, B does not occur and C does occur,
2. B occurs, A does not occur and C does occur,
3. C occurs, A does not occur and B does not occurs.
This use of the word "or" is technically called exclusive because it does not
include the case in which both or more events occur at the same time.
Here are two worlds in antithesis. By and large, probabilities of various out-
comes arising from any chosen alternative are objectively known. Conversely, a
lottery representing risky alternatives might be monetary gambles on the spin of
an unbiased roulette wheel. Furthermore, compound lotteries (L1, ..., Lk;α1, ..., αk)
(MWG, session 6.B) is the risky alternative that yields the simple lottery `k with
probability αk for k = 1, ...,K, given K simple lotteries `k = (pk1, ..., p
k
N), k =
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1, ...,K, and probabilities rk > 0 with
∑
k αk = 1. We can specify compound prob-
abilities with two uncertain events and a certain event in the following example.
Table 5. compound probabilities with heterogeneous valued weighted measure
EXAMPLE : The agent can carry fruits on the plate within three fruits. Letting
event A be an apple, event B be a banana and event C be a coconut on a plate. The
agent prefers three choices: an apple (a) to a banana (b) to a coconut (c). Three
events by each choice are: A  B  C. However, if the preference has the cardinal
value which can be numerical interpretation, then ordinal interpretation can be
challenged because it can have the homogeneity like:
P(r) × P(A) + P(r) × P(B) + P(r) × P(C) = 1
However, whether the weighted measure P(r) is homogenous or not, the
probability measure space ω = P(r) × P(A) + P(r) × P(B) + P(r) × P(C) is
different. In case of homogenous valued weighted measure P(r) = 1/10 and each
{P(A) = 1/2, P(B) = 1/3, P(C) = 1/6} has combined measure space 1. In case of
heterogeneous valued weighted measure at P(r), combined measure space is not 1.
How we can intepret risk preference when compound measure space is not 1. The
lottery at the origin can be assumed that
86
100
is certain.
We shall start by an attempt to define independence axiom (Von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944) and preferential consequentialism (Vergopoulos, 2011) from
certain probability methodology to uncertainty. for the risk preference A  B  C,
the origin point has less riskier and certain value, C. The lottery point C in the y-
axis is more riskier and uncertain value than B in the x-axis. Binary choice B or C
is described in the half space of rectangular shaped space which is like a triangle
because compound probabilities are not jointed but weighted. If we imagine the
game tree, several subgame trees exist independently:
1) The preference relation  on the space of simple lotteries ` satisfies the in the
independence axiom if for all L, L′, L” ∈ ` and α ∈ (0, 1), we have L  L′ if and
only if αL + (1 − α)L”  αL′ + (1 − α)L”
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2) Preferential consequentialism is that the agent firstly recognizes the
endogenous event (E), regardless of the preferred act g in the exogenous event
(Ec), he will choose the preferred act f in the endogenous event (E): fEg ∼E f .
3) Savage’s Sure Thing Principle (STP) (Savage 1954; Aumann, Hart): For any
event E ⊂ Ω and any acts f , g, h, k ∈ B(Ω), fEh 0 gEh↔ fEk 0 gEk where 0 is
an optimal ex ante choice in the backward induction.
4) Dynamic Consistency: For any information structure (Ei)1≤i≤n and any acts
f , g ∈ B(Ω), ∀i ∈ [1, n], f Ei g⇒ f 0 g. Additionally, if f ≺Ei g for some i
such that Ei is not null, then f ≺0 g.
By the independence axiom, the agent should choose the first lottery (L) than
the second lottery (L’) regardless of the third one (L"). Excess liquidity is not as
compelling to be needed for the analysis in the presence of certainty as it is under
uncertainty. Machina’s paradox (1987) is an interesting technique to demonstrate
the influence of "what might have been." on consequences which is the violation of
the independence axiom. The independence axiom sets out examine the more ob-
scure and puzzling aspect of the third lottery. The order of two lotteries by certain
preference does not depend on (is independent of) the appearance of the particu-
lar third lottery. Significantly, particular certain event has increasing importance
by the preference indifference in the preferential consequentialism. In that, any
event E is the subset of a finite set of information structure Ω. Among any atomic
act set f , g in the information structure Ω, the act fEg is conditionally defined by
"( fEg)(ω) = f (ω) if state ω ∈ E" and "( fEg)(ω) = g(ω) if ω ∈ Ec."
EXAMPLE (independence axiom): There are three outcomes: "a trip to New-
york," "eating a New-york styled bagel," and "staying in the office. " Suppose that
you prefer the first lottery to the second one and the second one to third one. The
choice to select the second lottery is rational if you anticipate that you cannot travel
to New-york. However, the independence axiom forces you to prefer the first lot-
tery to the second one (Machina Paradox in section 6.B, MWG).
EXAMPLE (Preferential consequentialism) : You are invited for a dinner (E).
You were supposed to drink a Beer (g) in case of staying at home (Ec). However,
you decide to carry a Wine ( f ) for an invitation of dinner(E).
A prospect is a point (A, B, C, D in a certain year) in a triangle. Consider the
four prospects A, B, C and D. Note that the slope of the line CD is (1 − a)(1 −
b)/a(1 − b) = (1 − a)/a. This is also the slope of the line AB. We assume that
the independence axiom implies that indifference curves are parallel lines. Thus, if
D  C, then expected utility must be rising along the line AB in the direction of B.
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Conversely, if D ≺ C, then expected utility must be decreasing along the line AB.
Supposed by the 45 degree slope and the point value in a specific year, a = 0.5,
b = 0.43 are contributed to calculate four prospects are as follows:
A = (0, 1, 0)
B = (1/2, 0, 1/2)
C = (0, 0.43, 0.57)
D = (0.285, 0, 0.715)
As we can see at B (1/2, 0, 1/2) and D (0.285, 0, 0.715), if the point is the
remotest from the origin point A, then the probability is 0 at the state 2 of certain
outcome x2.
Figure 5. Remoted prospects from the origin point
Dynamic consistency is to maintain dynamics of ex post preference to select
acts in case of the event (E), then the optimal ex ante preference by backward
induction also follows same dynamics. Under preferential consequentialism, stan-
dard arguments of non-consequential theories (e.g. Machina 1989; Epstein and Le
Breton 1993; Hanany and Klibanoff 2007; Vergopoulos, 2011, proposition 1) al-
lows us to assume that violation of Sure Thing Principle implies dynamic inconsis-
tency. The slopes of indifference curves indicate the individual’s relative sensitivity
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to changes in p1 versus changes in p3, are given by MRS(x2 → x3, x2 → x1) =
(U(x2; Fp1,p3 )−U(x1; Fp1,p3 /U(x3; Fp1,p3 −U(x2; Fp1,p3 )). A steeper slope indicates
a higher level of risk aversion. More risk averse of the local utility function raises
the slope of the indifference curves. The indifference curves will appear "fanned
out" (Machina, 1982) so that the relatively steeper slopes in the (p1, p3) plane near
the vertical axis than in the one near the horizontal axis illustrates the individual’s
greater sensitivity to changes in p1 relative to p3 when p1 is small relative to p3,
and vice versa.
Figure 6. risk preference and steeper slopes by fanned out
The precautionary reserve locates on the origin point which is not an argument
in uncertain outcome framework. Here by the argument is steeper slopes in the
(p1, p3) plane near the vertical axis which represents risk preference. Because the
logic of risk preference is outcome might be happened riskier so that the return of
riskier choices is expected greater than the choice in the origin point. Remarked
with two index, DD index (DD-R)/DD and RR index (R-RR)/R, the point of the
demand deposit (DD) index at the vertical axis than one of the required reserve
(RR) index at the horizontal axis raises the slope of the indifference curves.
4. Empirical founding in the case of Jordan and Lebanon during the period
1993-2015
This part takes a systemic and comprehensive approach from excess liquidity
to surplus liquidity with the case of Jordan and Lebanon during the period 1993-
2015. The MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region has passed political and
economic conflicts since the Gulf war in 1990 and 1991 located on Iraq, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia and Israel. It affects Jordan as a small open oil-importing country
who is geographically in Southwest Asia, south of Syria, west of Iraq, northwest
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of Saudi Arabia and east of Israel and the West Bank. As time goes by, conflict
areas neighbored with Jordan are seemed to have higher risk in finance. Especially,
liquid asset is spotlighted to be sent to a safer country Jordan and Lebanon by res-
idents in conflict areas.
Net lending in conflict areas is higher for restoration from the war. Ostensibly,
the confusion among net lending, grant and excess liquidity is bolded than before
1993. In case of Jordan, the holdings rate which is the exchange rate of a currency
against the special drawing right (SDR) derived from the currency’s representative
exchange rate reported by the central bank, is consistently about 1 from 1991 up
to 2016, radically decreasing from 2.5 in 1985. In detail, remoted from the im-
pact from the war, for the period (2009 – 2015), basic spread in financial sectors
in jordan: deposit interest rate, lending rate are consistently maintained from 4%
to 5% regarding to the bank lending-deposit spread. The deposit interest rate de-
creases from 4.8% in 2013 to 3.49% in 2015. In addition, the lending interest rate
decreases from 9.01% in 2013 to 8.47% in 2015 as well.
Real interest rate fluctuates even though there is stability of deposit interest rate,
lending rate and interest spread during 2003-2015. For economic financial stabil-
ity, in all probability, understanding liquidity in financial sector and remittance and
transaction in external sector is important than ever to analyze imbalanced part in
Jordan.
According to S.Gray (2006), excess reserves are described the position of most
developed country central banks: the Bank of England, the US Federal Reserve
Bank, the European (System of) Central Banks and the Bank of Japan. In addition,
it could be the case that the surplus is represented by excess cash in circulation
(supply is greater than demand) rather than by commercial bank balances at the
central bank; this is unlikely although it can be observed in a few countries. In
case of Jordan, this is the case of excess cash. On the other hand, cash is on deficit
as the percentage of GDP Regarding reserve money which contains currency and
reserves in central bank of Jordan, issued currency composed the major part of
reserve money during the period (2013-2015) and approximated 60% on average.
Issued currency increased from 3559 Jordanian million dinars in 2012 to 4336
Jordanian million dinars in 2015 and reserve money as well increased from 5229
Jordanian dinars in 2013 to 7505 Jordanian dinars in 2015.
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) after the Gulf war from 1990 and 1991
can access to get good loan opportunities: debt forgiveness. It is of course not
needed to say laziness of conflict countries to be vulnerable by external shocks in
their economies. To put it differently, the exact probabilities to indicate the bank
behavior in spite of short time series data which cannot be shocked durably and
sequentially up to future, better put, the worst situation is happened and should be
recovered by net lending, should be noted.
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5. Summary
Credit rationing is rationing of excess liquidity by risk preference on compara-
ble statics of liquid investment. This study addressed two research questions: First,
the key question to be asked is how a subject of excess reserves in excess liquidity
after the banking crisis of the early 1930s or 1970 can be re-identified in 2016. And
second, needs of new technique about risk preference provides a useful ground to
test the cross-sectional data between economics and finance by applying theories
about uncertainty which is hereby the Machina’s triangle (1982, 1987). For one
thing, Excess liquidity has simply deduced itself from required reserves in banks.
By the way, if Increasing credit rationing at the precautionary level stand out from
the gap of required reserves and pledgeable demand deposit, RR−DD > 0. Not the
least of these is its mixture of styles, increasing credit rationing at the aim of in-
vestment is within fixed reserve scale, Reserves (R) - Demand Deposit (DD). Most
obviously, risk preference in the triangle distinguishes between risky loving behav-
ior inside of a triangle and risk aversion behavior at the origin. As has been noted
earlier, comparative statics in investment is a richly detailed study of the nature of
monotonic required regulation criteria. Especially important is hard regulation on
increasing the precautionary level is impossible to quibble with increasing every
level set above required level. Consequently, the aim of soft regulation is to check
comparatively statics to sufficiently follow the trend of guideline. not a limitation
of specific guideline about an amount. This technical result of my study point to
several promising applications for regulatory issues.
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6. (Annex)
6.1. Village I (Jordan)
identification symbols: DD (Demand Deposit), RR (Required Reserves), R (Reserve), EL=Excess Liquidity
Year DD-RR/R R-RR/RR, Precautionary Reserves RR/DD, RR index (1-11th)
1993 -35% 567%,certain outcome 23%,3th(below 30%)
1994 -37% 567%,certain outcome 24%,3th(below 30%)
1995 -38% 567%,certain outcome 24%,3th(below 30%)
1996 -36% 567%,certain outcome 24%,3th(below 30%)
1997 -41% 614%,certain outcome 24%,3th(below 30%)
1998 -33% 614%,certain outcome 21%,3th(below 30%)
1999 -38% 614%,certain outcome 23%,3th(below 30%)
2000 -29% 900%,certain outcome 14%,2th(below 20%)
2001 -15% 1150%,certain outcome 9%,1th(below 10%)
2002 1% 92%,uncertain outcome 11th(over 100%)
2003 2% 92%,uncertain outcome 11th(over 100%)
2004 27% 92%,uncertain outcome 11th(over 100%)
2005 23% 92%,uncertain outcome 11th(over 100%)
2006 12% 92%,uncertain outcome 11th(over 100%)
2007 9% 92%,uncertain outcome 11th(over 100%)
2008 0% 91%,certain outcome 1th(below 10%)
2009 12% 93%,uncertain outcome 11th(over 100%)
2010 15% 93%,uncertain outcome 11th(over 100%)
2011 20% 93%,uncertain outcome 11th(over 100%)
2012 30% 93%,uncertain outcome 11th(over 100%)
2013 28% 93%,uncertain outcome 11th(over 100%)
2014 22% 93%,uncertain outcome 11th(over 100%)
2015 25% 93%,uncertain outcome 11th(over 100%)
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6.2. Risk preference description in the Machina Triangle
Village I (Jordan)
Framework of risk preference in the Machina Triangle
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6.3. Village II (Lebanon)
identification symbols: DD (Demand Deposit), RR (Required Reserves), R (Reserve), EL=Excess Liquidity
Year DD-R/R R-RR/RR, Precautionary Reserves RR/DD, RR index (1-11th)
1993 -70% 233%,certain outcome 98%,10th(below 100%)
1994 -82% 233%,certain outcome 166,11th
1995 -85% 233%,certain outcome 204,11th
1996 -87% 233%,certain outcome 226,11th
1997 -89% 233%,certain outcome 267,11th
1998 -88% 233%,certain outcome 253,11th
1999 -87% 233%,certain outcome 237,11th
2000 -88% 233%,certain outcome 248,11th
2001 -92% 233%,certain outcome 354,11th
2002 -91% 233%,certain outcome 323,11th
2003 -95% 233%,certain outcome 661,11th
2004 -95% 233%,certain outcome 641,11th
2005 -96% 233%,certain outcome 678,11th
2006 -95% 233%,certain outcome 603,11th
2007 -95% 233%,certain outcome 554,11th
2008 -95% 233%,certain outcome 566,11th
2009 -95% 233%,certain outcome 663,11th
2010 -95% 233%,certain outcome 618,11th
2011 -96% 233%,certain outcome 667,11th
2012 -95% 233%,certain outcome 624,11th
2013 -95% 233%,certain outcome 593,11th
2014 -95% 233%,certain outcome 629,11th
2015 -95% 233%,certain outcome 650,11th
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